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Kenya’s 2010 Constitution declares equity to be an underlying principle of governance in the country, which is 
consistent with its provision for devolution. While nature vastly differentiated Kenya, successive governments 
did little to exploit opportunities for providing the scope for nationwide development. Kenya’s search for 
cohesive national development will only succeed if there is a nationwide appreciation of the history of our 
contemporary inequalities, which are at the root of Kenyans’ great hope in devolution. What matters now is the 
need for equitable disbursement of funds to the 47 countries. This study, it is hoped, will provide a 
comprehensive overview of the factors to be considered in revenue allocation to the devolved government in 
Kenya.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of writing a new constitution for Kenya dates 
back to early 90’s with the clamour for a Multi-Party 
democracy. The first attempt was unsuccessful when the 
proposed constitution (Commonly referred to as the 
Wako Draft) was rejected in a national referendum in 
November 2005 (Omolo, 2010). The current process 
started in April 2008 as part of the National Accord 
agreements for sustained stability in Kenya. The struggle 
for constitutional reforms has its roots in the desire to 
correct the deficiencies in the governance framework of 
the country. A central objective of the struggle has been 
the restoration of power to local communities to manage 
their affairs particularly in matters of local development 
(TBurugu, 2010). The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 has 
fundamentally altered this defective governance 
framework of the country through various far reaching 
reforms. Of these far reaching reforms devolution is likely 
to have the most profound impact on governance. 
(Mwenda 2010). 
This study was guided by the need of the devolved 
Government of Kenya to come up with an equitable way 
of allocating funds to the newly created 47 Counties. 
Optimism about the positive economic effects of 
devolution was a strong factor in the devolution debates 
in the agitation for the Constitutional change in Kenya. 
According to Chapter two of the new Kenya Constitution; 
the sovereign power of the people is exercised at - (a) the 
national level; (b) the regional level; and (c) the county 
level. The governments at the various levels are distinct 
and inter-dependent and conduct their mutual relations 
on the basis of consultation and cooperation.‖ This sets 
the stage for allocation of funds to run these three tier 
Governments. The Commission on Revenue Allocation 
(CRA) has been charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring equitable revenue allocation to the Central 
Government and the local Governments. 
The advent of devolution in the government of Kenya is 
expected to lead to the practice of a more balanced 
system of fiscal federalism, more transparency, fiscal 
accountability and more devolution of power to lower 
units of government and hence more fiscal 
decentralization. While a greater degree of 
decentralization would, no doubt, contribute to greater 
grassroots participation, generate more local  
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development, increase efficiency and equity, create 
employment opportunity and promote poverty alleviation, 
it must not be done in such a way as to conflict with the 
national objective or unduly complicate it (Omolo, 2010). 
The change in the internal geographic structure of the 
nation as a result of strong and continuous agitation for 
fair share of the ‘national cake’ led to distortion in the 
revenue allocation formula. It is in the light of the 
unbalanced economic growth process in Kenya that we 
need to examine empirically the factors to be considered 
in revenue allocation to the county governments. 
The issue of revenue allocation in Kenya is a 
fundamental one that border on promotion of national 
unity and rapid economic growth. It is however sad that 
despite continuous increase in revenue generation in 
Kenya over the years, the expected impact on economic 
growth in Kenya has not been realized (Kiringai, 2006). 
Hence the need to examine empirically the factors that 
need to be considered in coming up with an equitable 
revenue allocation formula. According to the new 
Constitution of Kenya, Division of Revenue is provided for 
in Article 217. In doing so the senate shall take into 
consideration a number of factors in determining the 
basis for allocating among the counties the share of 
national revenue through a resolution every 5 years. 
However these factors are not clearly spelt out, this calls 
for an empirical investigation into the factors to be 
considered. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Kenya’s 1963 Constitution did not provide for revenue 
sharing between national and sub-national governments, 
a situation that led to under-provisioning at these lower 
levels of government, affecting their service delivery. This 
position has been reversed in the new Constitution, which 
entrenches fiscal devolution that provides for sharing of 
both the revenue base and the nationally collected 
revenues. Chapter eleven of the New Constitution of 
Kenya provides for a devolved government (Mwenda, 
2010). 
Devolution can impact governance by reducing the 
possibility of grand corruption as resources are 
distributed and local communities can be able to mobilize 
pressure against rent seeking and corruption (Mwenda, 
2009). It can make a democracy stronger by giving 
people more say in their local matters. It allows people 
living in a particular area to make their own decisions on 
matters that concern them directly. In addition, the 2010 
Constitution sets out criteria to be followed when sharing 
the revenues vertically; among other things the 
Constitution requires the following: 
- Prioritizing national interest, specifically national debt 
obligations; 
- Addressing the needs of the national government while 
ensuring counties deliver on functions allocated to them 
and meet their development needs; 
 
 
 
 
- Maximizing fiscal capacity and efficiency of county 
governments.  
- Addressing disparities between and within counties 
together with incorporation of affirmative action for 
disadvantaged areas and groups; 
- Optimizing county economic potentials; Ensuring stable 
and predictable revenue allocations; and maintaining 
flexibility and ability to respond to emergencies. 
 
The 2010 Constitution goes ahead to set the aggregate 
minimum transfer to counties at 15 per cent of centrally 
collected revenues, a threshold that will be based on the 
latest audited national revenue receipts. The Constitution 
also mandates additional transfers depending on 
functions delegated to countries. In addition, the 
Government is required to establish an Equalization 
Fund, financed by 0.005 per cent (one-half per cent) of 
nationally collected revenues, to be reserved for 
marginalized areas to finance basic services like water, 
roads, electricity, and so on. The fund is to be maintained 
for an initial 20 years at least, and may be extended by 
the National Assembly. The Constitution provides that a 
bill to appropriate money out of the Equalization Fund be 
prepared and scrutinized by the Revenue Sharing 
Commission, which is required to advise the two Houses 
of the National Assembly. Unfortunately, the Constitution 
does not indicate who is responsible for preparing this 
bill. In the view of the authors, this provision should be 
detailed in the appropriate law. With the clarity on 
revenue sharing provisions that provide for a minimum 
quantum of resources set aside for counties, the 
possibility of conflicts between the legislature and the 
executive and between the national government and the 
counties has been minimized. Some politicians have 
created confusion, however, by giving their constituents 
the impression that the 15 per cent allocation from the 
central government will be given in addition to what they 
are already getting from the Local Authorities Transfer 
Fund (LATF) and the CDF. Ideally, there should be no 
confusion because the Constitution makes it clear that 
counties should be given adequate funds to fulfill their 
mandates. 
There is an urgent need to move fast to delineate the 
functions of the two levels of government and eliminate 
duplication. Depending on which functions are devolved, 
it will be much easier to determine whether 15 per cent is 
adequate or not. If it is not adequate, the Constitution 
requires that more resources be transferred to match the 
increased functions of the country governments.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The researchers used survey study method to collect 
primary data, while secondary data was collected using 
document analysis. The design enabled the researchers 
to collect data on the factors to be considered in revenue 
allocation. The people involved in the study were both  
  
 
 
 
 
male and female adults who cut across all socio-
economic status.  
 
Population  
The population of this study comprised the 47 counties in 
Kenya. The target population was the three counties 
namely Kiambu County, Kisii County and Homa Bay 
County. The target population was chosen because they 
represent the three categories of counties, namely, self 
sustaining counties (Kiambu), non marginalised counties 
(Kisii) and marginalised counties (Homa-Bay). 
Sampling method was adopted to adequately 
manipulate the enormous population. In order to 
determine the sample size of the study, the researchers 
drew the sample from the population of Local 
Government Headquarters in the three countries. This 
involved the planning department of the local 
governments. The population of 26 local authorities in the 
three counties was used. Cluster sampling, according to 
Kothari (2009), is considered a more practical approach 
to surveys because it samples by groups or clusters of 
elements rather than by individual elements". Each of the 
target population was divided into three clusters. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Past Political Affiliation 
There exists a great disparity in the distribution of income 
in Kenya, with extremes of the wealthy on one end and 
the poor on the other. The country’s top 10% households 
control 42% of the total income while the bottom 10% 
controls less than 1%. This problem of inequality is born 
and bred in Kenya and it is political to the extent that it 
results from resource allocation – a highly contested 
political terrain. The emergence of a powerful political and 
landed class that moved to active party politics to protect 
their ill-gotten wealth meant that politics in Kenya became 
a monopoly of this class to the exclusion of the majority of 
Kenyans who happen to be poor. 
There followed a complex web of corruption initiated 
purposely by this political class to acquire capital to buy 
political power. Those who acquired the political capital 
were elected to Parliament and appointed Cabinet 
Ministers, positions that ensured that they politically 
protected their ill-gotten wealth. This also ensured that 
they retained access to state resources, which they would 
distribute to serve the political interest of the regime in 
power. This scenario is recurrent, and can be seen 
replaying itself even under the present regime. Clearly, it 
is adverse to the process of development in Kenya. Past 
political affiliation only applies to a class of individuals 
and not regions. The study found that this parameter is 
therefore not appropriate in allocating revenue to the 
counties. 
 
Poverty index 
Poverty in Kenya is caused by a number of factors, which 
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include low agricultural productivity and poor marketing of 
industrial and agricultural products, insecurity, 
unemployment and low wages, poor governance, 
misallocation of land, inequality of income and assets, 
inequality in access to economic opportunities, lack of 
education, unfavourable climatic conditions, HIV/AIDs, 
gender insensitive property rights regimes, and weak 
democratic institutions. The highest wage from 0 to 90% 
level is 15,000 a month. From 91% - 99 % the wage 
rockets to Kshs 100, 000. And the 1% above the 99% 
level earn beyond Kshs 100,000 a month. Thus the top 
1% can be considered as the economic, social and 
political elite. And the nine percent below may be 
categorized as the various levels of the emerging middle 
class. The remaining 90% who earn 15,000 (highest) to 0 
monthly are workers and peasants in urban and rural 
areas. A more comprehensive picture of social 
stratification however is not possible given the lack of 
data on income and especially assets. Most households 
do not report truthfully or fully the assets they own in 
national surveys. 
Moreover such surveys are often designed to collect 
data on household consumption rather than ownership of 
assets or household wealth. Given these limitations, a 
large part of our analysis is restricted to the 14% of the 
Kenyan working population who are wage earners and 
their households. It is nevertheless clear that this sub set 
of the sample is representative of the broader society, in 
particular trends can be observed in the constitution of 
socio-economic classes. The huge inequality in wages, if 
anything, understates that of wealth in general. Moreover 
it mirrors the huge qualitative difference in the living 
standards enjoyed by the ruling elite (political, business, 
and so on) and those of everybody else. The wealth gap 
between the elite constituting less than 1% of the 
population but controlling disproportionate resources and 
earning sometimes thousands of times the median wage 
earned by the bottom 90% is only hinted at by the wage 
differentials. Clearly the wealthiest Kenyans make most 
of their money from their wealth and a more careful study 
of the wealth distribution using adapted data sources and 
methodology is required. 
Poverty levels in Homabay county was found to be over 
10 times higher than the neigbouring Kisii county. This 
was based on the income levels of an average adult 
provided by the local authorities.  
 
Difference in poverty levels 
Poverty levels can vary within and without regions. For 
instance, in an earlier survey, although the proportion of 
people living below the poverty line in Nairobi is 44%, 
poverty levels range from 8% in Nairobi west, Kibera 
division to 77% in Makongeni, Makadara Division (GoK, 
2010). The social phenomenon ordinarily known as 
inequality evokes strong passions and sometimes stirs 
controversy. In Kenya this disparity extends to inequality  
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in counties. Some regions have continued to be 
neglected over the years and the poverty index of 
counties is as varied as the poverty index of individuals. 
The marginalized counties should therefore be given 
incentives to catch up with the non marginalized 
countries. 
 
Population of the county 
Centralization denied the local population a genuine 
platform for participation as the public officers at the 
centre are far removed from the citizens and not bound 
by the views or suggestions made to field officers. A 
critical issue for consideration is the determination of the 
criteria to be used to determine the size and number of 
Wards in Kenya, and consecutively, the determination of 
Wards per each County. In this study, the public has 
elicited various views on the size and population of a 
County Assembly ward. A sub location for densely 
populated areas and a location for sparsely populated 
areas should be divided according to a population quota 
to ensure efficient service delivery. 
All respondents were unanimous that population size 
should not be considered in the sparsely populated areas 
(Northern and North Eastern Kenya) because of low 
population occupying very big area. This should not to 
obscure the specificity of service delivery needs of the 
county populations and, therefore, the necessary focus 
with which population should be considered as a 
parameter for revenue allocation should be designed and 
carried out in such a way that there is equity in the 
densely and sparsely populated areas. A more 
enlightened approach would be to observe and borrow 
Constitutional requirements on Parliamentary 
representation boundaries formula that may lead to some 
merger of current local authority wards so as to establish 
more realistic boundaries for the county wards. There 
appears to be a commonality of thought that highly 
populated areas should enjoy a dimension shrink while 
areas that are thinly populated should suffer a land mass 
pull out in line with provisions 89(6) of the Constitution. 
 
Infrastructure development of the county 
Regional disparities in infrastructure development in 
Kenya are closely related to expenditure on 
infrastructure. Some counties like Kiambu county are 
highly developed in terms of infrastructure compared to 
Homa Bay County. County governments to plan, 
prioritize, and use public resources to deliver public 
services and infrastructure in response to local needs. 
For the decentralisation system to be one in which people 
have greater access to adequate and relevant services 
that satisfy local needs and preferences, there is need for 
equitable distribution of infrastructure development. 
92.8% of respondents were in agreement that 
infrastructure development should be one of the key 
parameters in revenue allocation to county governments  
 
 
 
 
with a view to bringing equitable development. 
County governments have been assigned the central 
role in the development and delivery of infrastructure in 
the new constitution. Counties are mandated to plan, 
develop, manage and maintain a broad range of 
infrastructure within their jurisdictions. These include 
agriculture related facilities such as cattle dips, livestock 
sale yards, county abattoirs, health facilities, refuse 
dumps, cinemas, libraries, museums, county roads, 
ferries and harbours, markets, housing, village 
polytechnics, storm water drainage, water and sanitation 
installations, fire stations, among others. The National 
Government is, among other roles, charged with the 
responsibility for national economic policy and planning, 
national standards, regulation, national public works, 
national statistics, immigration and citizenship, 
macroeconomic management, foreign affairs, defence 
and natural resources. 
The infrastructure development responsibilities of 
counties include: county roads, storm water drains, water 
supply, sewerage, solid waste dumps, hazardous waste 
disposal facilities, security and street lighting, 
telecommunications utilities, ferries and harbours, public 
road transport, markets, country abattoirs and slaughter 
houses, livestock sale yards, countty assembly halls, 
county offices and buildings, fire stations, county 
hospitals, health centres and dispensaries, cemeteries, 
conference and social halls, cinemas, museums, 
electricity and gas reticulation infrastructure, libraries, 
county stadia and parks, vehicle parking yards and silos, 
housing development, village polytechnics, home craft 
centres, nursery schools and child care facilities. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Devolution of government is a new phenomenon in 
Kenya; the Government shall, therefore, need to take into 
consideration a number of factors in determining the 
basis for allocating among the counties the share of 
national revenue through a resolution every 5 years. 
These factors are not spelt out in the constitution and are 
subject to review every five years. In order to make 
revenue allocation be successful and without conflict the 
criteria for identification of marginalized areas should be 
transparent and clear to all; however there is no clear 
method to be followed. For instance, the conflict is usually 
whether the principle of derivation, need, natural interest 
or landmass should be used as a basis for the purpose. 
Even when these principles may be generally accepted 
as the main basis for working out revenue allocation 
formula, conflict is still likely to arise following as to which 
of the principles take precedence over others as the main 
criteria for sharing the revenue and determining 
marginalization. 
This paper considered four parameters namely, past 
political affiliation, poverty index, population and 
infrastructure development. The study reveals that past  
  
 
 
 
 
political affiliation should not be considered as parameter 
for revenue allocation. The study recommends that 
poverty index, population and level of infrastructure 
development on the countries of Kenya should be 
considered when allocating revenue to the 47 counties in 
Kenya. We recommend further research should be 
carried out to test more parameters and also determine 
the proportions of the parameters to be applied in the 
revenue allocation formula. Further research is also 
recommended for a viable and flexible finance model for 
equitable revenue allocation. 
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